Can you Dig’ Bus Disasters?

The "Can You Dig’ It?" series is this blogger’s attempt in hitting the ratio decidendi of a particular case decided by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. This series of self-authored compendiums is this blogger’s way of suppressing the rigorous life in law school.


BATACLAN v. MEDINA
G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957
Montemayor, J.

"In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence."

Facts:
A bus operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina was on its way to Pasay City. Among the passengers was Juan Bataclan. While the bus was running, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Bataclan and three others could not get out of the overturned bus.

After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. The lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.

"Come to think of it, my tenure is filled with bus disasters eh?..."

By reason of his Bataclan’s death, his widow brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan was still alive, and so damages are awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him.

The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The latter endorsed the appeal to the SC because of the value involved in the claim.

Issue:
Whether or not defendant is liable for the death of the victim

Held:
Yes. Pursuant to the provisions of the civil code, in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence.

The SC disagrees with the trial court’s ruling. Proximate cause is defined that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

In the present, the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected and that because it was dark, the rescuers had to carry a light with them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.

Moreover, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

Can you Dig’ Boorish UP Products?

The "Can You Dig’ It?" series is this blogger’s attempt in hitting the ratio decidendi of a particular case decided by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. This series of self-authored compendiums is this blogger’s way of suppressing the rigorous life in law school.

Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
June 30, 2008
Carpio Morales, J.

“An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law.”
–Supreme Court of the Philippines

Facts:
This case involves a Calamba City regional Trial Court judge who told a lawyer that since the latter is not a product of the UP College of Law, they could not be equals.

In the court proceedings last February 27, 2006, Belen boorishly asked Melvin Mane, the petitioner, if he graduated from the UP College of Law. The petitioner replied that he graduated from Manuel L. Quezon University and was proud of it.

The judge then responded: “Then you’re not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a saying and I know this, not all law students are created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme Being [said] that we all are created equal in His form and substance.”

During the subject hearing, not only did the respondent judge make insulting and demeaning remarks to the petitioner but also engaged in unnecessary lecturing and debating. Belen even directed a court employee to show Mane the judge’s statements of assets and liabilities, among others.

Mane filed an administrative complaint shortly after the incident, and the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found cause to file an administrative case, although the lawyer later withdrew the complaint, admitting his “impulsiveness.” The OCA declared that the withdrawal or desistance of a complainant from pursuing an administrative complaint does not divest the Court of its disciplinary authority over court officials and personnel.

Issue:

The issue at hand here is plainly whether or not the statements and actions made by the respondent judge during the subject hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Held:

The Court held Judge Medel Arnaldo Belen GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge. Respondent clearly went out of bounds.

An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which this Court administers, taking of the Lawyer’s oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.

The Court cited Belen’s violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that a judge should be courteous to counsel, especially to those who are young and inexperienced and also to all those others appearing or concerned in the administration of justice in the court. He should be courteous and civil, for it is unbecoming of a judge to utter intemperate language during the hearing of a case. He should not interrupt counsel in their arguments except to clarify his mind as to their positions. Nor should he be tempted to an unnecessary display of learning or premature judgment. He may utilize his opportunities to criticize and correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys, brought to his attention, but he may not do so in an insulting manner.

A judge’s official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. He must at all times be temperate in his language for the noble position in the bench demands courteous speech in and out of the Court.

Respondent judge’s insulting statements which tend to question complainant’s capability and credibility stemming from the fact that the latter did not graduated from UP Law school is clearly unwarranted and inexcusable. Respondent opted for a conceited display of arrogance, a conduct that falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. If Belen felt that there is a need to admonish complainant Atty. Mane, he should have called him in his chambers where he can advise him privately rather than battering him with insulting remarks and embarrassing questions such as asking him from what school he came from publicly in the courtroom and in the presence of his clients. Humiliating a lawyer is highly reprehensible. It betrays the judge’s lack of patience and temperance. A highly temperamental judge could hardly make decisions with equanimity.

The Court also reminded Belen that judges should always be aware that disrespect to lawyers generates disrespect to them. There must be mutual concession of respect. Respect is not a one-way ticket where the judge should be respected but free to insult lawyers and others who appear in his court. Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding.

Respondent Judge was REPRIMANDED and was further warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Can you Dig’ Piracy?

The “Can You Dig’ It?” series is this blogger’s attempt in hitting the ratio decidendi of a particular case decided by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. This series of self-authored compendiums is this blogger’s way of suppressing the rigorous life in law school.

People of the Philippine Islands vs. Lol-lo and Saraw
G.R. No. L-17958 February 27, 1922
Malcolm, J.

Facts:
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats containing Dutch subjects sailed from one Dutch island to another. After navigating for a number of days, the second boat, while still on Dutch East Indies territory, was surrounded by 6 Vintas containing 24 armed Moros, which includes Lol-lo and Saraw. The Moros pretended to ask for food to board the boat. Once on the boat, they attacked some of the men, violated two of the women, and took all of the cargo. The Moros took the two women to the island of Maruro and repeatedly violated them. The two women escaped afterwards. After returning to the island of Tawi-tawi, both Lol-lo and Saraw were captured and charged with the crime of piracy.

Issue:
Whether the Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over a crime that happened in the high seas

Held:
Guilty. Pirates are in law hostis humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all.

Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.